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Abstract  
 
The presence of dysfunctional formal institutions in the Palestinian Territories might drive 
the citizens to concentrate on alternative forms of governance more community-oriented. 
Under these circumstances the set of informal institutions embedded in the social capital of 
the Palestinian community might help to explain the Palestinians attitude towards corrupt 
aversion. Hence, by using a unique Palestinian survey conducted in 2007 in West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, we analyse the relationship between social capital and Palestinians attitude 
towards corrupt aversion. The variables of social capital refer to voluntary activities and civic 
attitude while corrupt aversion is captured by the Palestinians’ attitudes towards the use of 
bribes at work and the importance of fighting corruption. A bivariate probit model reports 
that corrupt aversion increases with civic attitude and is lower among Palestinians involved in 
voluntary activities. Predicted conditional probabilities suggest that under negative view of 
formal institutions and lack of social trust, Palestinians need more civic attitude to cope with 
corrupt aversion.   
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1 Introduction 
 
 
Social capital and corruption seem to be related one to another in a puzzling way. Social 
capital can be understood as those elements such as trust, norms and networks that can 
improve the efficiency of a society by reducing transaction costs, facilitating collective 
actions and lowering opportunistic behaviour (Grootaert 2001). On the other hand, corruption 
can be defined as “the misuse of entrusted authority for private benefit” (Seldadyo and Haan 
2006 p.2). In order to be effective, corrupt exchanges need to occur within a “normative 
system” that has to keep secret (Della Porta and Vannucci 1999, Shleifer 1993). This means 
that within this “normative system” rules cannot be enforced by law. Therefore a corrupt 
exchange bases its strength upon trust, loyalty and reciprocity occurring among the agents 
involved in the action (Warren 2001).  
While the optimistic view of social capital indicates in the elements of trust and reciprocity 
the key-solution to free riding problems, the same elements become essential for 
opportunistic behaviour to occur and, hence, for corrupt exchange to exist. For these reasons, 
in the literature the relationship between corruption and social capital has been analysed from 
different perspectives without reaching a unidirectional conclusion. In fact, even though a 
relevant number of studies report a significant correlation between increasing social capital 
and decreasing corruption (La Porta et al 1997, Uslaner 2002), several scholars argue that 
social capital does not produce always positive externalities (Fukuyama 2001, Putnam 2000, 
Warren 2001). For instance, in closed community where interpersonal relations are based on 
strong ties, the access of the social resources might be easily available to the members of the 
community but denied to the outsiders. This makes the access to public and/or social 
resources available according to group-membership rather than to meritocratic reasons. 
Hence, the access of non group-members is more likely to be subject to additional charge or 
bribes (Bjornskov 2003).  
Given this puzzling framework, the analysis of the relationship between social capital and 
corruption becomes even more relevant in a geopolitical context under a state capacity 
building process like the Palestinian one. In this sense, the Palestinian reality can represent a 
remarkable case study. Given the particular geopolitical conditions of the area, the presence 
of dysfunctional formal institutions might drive the Palestinians to concentrate on alternative 
forms of governance more community-oriented with relevant consequences on their attitudes 
toward corrupt aversion. In fact, it can be argued that contexts characterised by weak and 
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dysfunctional institutions might induce citizens to distrust institutions and, hence, to pursue 
their goals through the NGOs sector (Torgler et al 2011). Individuals more involved in 
voluntary activities might also be more aware about the dysfunctional characteristics of the 
public institutions and hence more willing to pursue their social goals through the 
participation to associations. On the basis of this similar reasoning previous studies report a 
negative relationship between social norms against bribing and participation in associational 
activities (Torgler et al. 2011). So, individuals tend to be more involved in voluntary 
activities because more aware about the dysfunctional and weak institutions. Hence, 
collective actions might become a substitute of the state (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004) 
driving the individuals more involved to be less incline in fighting the use of bribes and 
corruption within the more traditional public institutional framework because more driven to 
pursue their goals through the non-governmental sector.    
This mechanism should be even more exacerbated where trust in formal institutions is weak. 
Of course, this does not mean that citizens involved in voluntary activities are in favour of a 
corrupted system. Instead, this might indicate that where citizens lose confidence in public 
institutions are more likely to pursue their goals through collective actions with the 
consequence of considering compacting corruption not a priority within their strategic 
agenda.    
Given this peculiar framework, the aim of the paper is to analyse the relationship between 
social capital and attitude toward corrupt aversion among Palestinians. To this purpose, we 
use data from a Palestinian public opinion survey conducted in 2007 in West Bank and Gaza 
Strip by Nasr and Hilal (2007) and administered by the Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics. The variables capturing the attitudes toward corrupt aversion are based upon the 
opinion that Palestinians have about the use of bribes at work and the importance of fighting 
corruption. The variables of social capital refer to civic attitudes and individuals involved in 
voluntary activities.  
We test the relationship between corruption and social capital by applying a reduced form 
bivariate probit model. Empirical evidence reports that individuals involved in voluntary 
activities declare to be less corrupt averse. On the contrary, pro-civic attitude individuals 
declare that bribery at work cannot be justified. All these relationships are amplified in case 
of lack of social trust and under a negative view of formal institutions, low trust towards 
public institutions and low confidence in the rule of law. In fact, under these conditions it 
seems that an individual needs more civic attitude in order to cope with corrupt aversion.      
The paper is structured as it follows. 
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Section 2 discusses the issue of corruption in the Palestinian context; section 3 presents the 
empirical methodology and the data; section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results; 
section 5 addresses some robustness analysis; section 6 discusses some of the limitations of 
this work and section 7 concludes.   
 
 
2. Corruption in the Palestinian Context  
 
The Palestinian Territories have been included in the Transparency International (TI) study 
only recently. The survey conducted by Transparency International in 2014 reports that 22% 
of Palestinians feels that corruption has increased tremendously in the last two years. Still, 
among the institutions, 42% of the respondents consider thee political parties extreme 
corrupted, 26% of the respondents feel that the Parliament is very corrupted and 22% feels 
that the judicial system is corrupted.      
The poll conducted by AMAN (2009), the Coalition for Accountability and Integrity in 
Palestinian Territories, reports that 63% of respondents believe that wasta, nepotism and 
favouritism are the most common forms of corruption in the public sector mainly used for 
personal interests and for accessing to public services. According to the poll, dysfunctions in 
the rule of law and accountability are among the main factors of corruption and they are 
attributed to the absence of the rule of law, an insufficient punitive legislation and to 
ineffective system of monitoring institutions. These factors undermine the regulatory capacity 
of fighting corruption and not only.  
The lack of institutional transparency is likely to date back to the first Palestinian government 
established without a legislative authority in 1994 and merely on the basis of the Oslo 
Agreement (AMAN 2009). Given the particular geopolitical circumstances of the Palestinian 
Territories, the mechanisms of governance adopted by the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA) at that time derive from the revolutionary resistance movement of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) where the transparency of institutions and rule of law were 
not priorities.    
Inevitably, this contributes to produce a sense of frustration among citizens as well as 
mistrust toward public institutions
1
 (AMAN 2009).  
                                                          
1
 A discussion about the Palestinian regulatory capacity has been developed in Andriani (2011).  
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It is argued that the increasing number of Israeli settlements in West Bank during the post-
Oslo period undermines the leadership of Arafat, president of the PNA, who developed a 
hierarchic system based on personal ties and vertical linkages (Jamal 2007). Within this 
system, associations and voluntary organisations were welcome as long as they were inclined 
to support the politics of the PNA. For this reason, Jamal (2007) describes the Palestinian 
associational activity of that period as polarised between pro-PNA associations and not-
supporting associations. Since the former developed a system of vertical linkage with the 
Palestinian institutions, they could have a better access to local economic and political 
resources compare to the non-supporting associations (Jamal, 2007). 
Even though, after the death of Arafat in 2004, part of the reform agenda of the Palestinian 
institutions is devoted to anti-corruption measures (Siegman et al., 2005)., the “political dis-
aggregation” following the results of the elections of 2006, has favoured even more the 
diffusion of wasta and nepotism in the recruitment of public officials on the basis of their 
political affiliations and of media professionals (AMAN, 2009). In addition, it is argued that 
the regulatory capacity and the accountability of the Palestinian institutions have been 
undermined on the one hand by the impossibility of using oversight instruments including 
interpellations, accountability and formation of commissions of inquiry, on the other hand by 
the lack of an effective auditing system able to verify potential irregularities in the annual 
financial report of the Ministry of Finance (AMAN 2009). 
 
 
3 Empirical Methodology and Data 
 
 
3.1 Bivariate Probit: the Baseline Model  
Attitudes toward corrupt aversion and social capital might depend on similar socio-economic 
and demographic factors. In addition, since corrupt aversion is part of an individual’s social 
attitude, it is likely that social capital and corrupt aversion are significantly correlated by 
unobservable factors. For this reason, the propensity of declaring of being corrupt-averse in 
the presence of social capital is described by a specified bivariate probit model in latent 
variables where iy 1
* is the unobservable propensity of individuals to declare of being corrupt 
averse and iy 2
* is the unobservable propensity of individuals of holding social capital. 
Following Cavatorta and Pieroni (2013), the application of the bivariate probit consists of a 
system of two binary probit equations estimated jointly by the maximum likelihood method 
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where corrupt aversion and social capital are the respective dependent variables, functions of 
a set of socio-economic covariates plus an error term as in the equations (2) and (3).     
 
iii uxy 1111 '*          (2) 
                                                       11 iy  if  0*1 iy  
                                                       01 iy     otherwise 
 
iii uxy 2222 '*         (3) 
                                                       12 iy  if  0*2 iy  
                                                       02 iy     otherwise 
 
),1,1,0,0(~},{ 221 ii uu   (4) 
 
where 11 iy indicates the individual declaring to be corrupt-averse which depends on socio-
economic factors ix1 . 12 iy  indicates the individual “holding” social capital which depends 
on socio-economic factors ix2 . The errors },{ 21 ii uu are assumed to have a standard bivariate 
normal distribution 2 with ),cov( 21 ii uu . A significant covariance estimate suggests that 
the corrupt aversion and social capital are interrelated by unobservable factors such as 
unobservable characteristics of the respondents that may influence both their self-assessed 
corrupt aversion and their social capital.  
Given these assumptions, the probability for an individual to declare to be corrupt-averse and 
that holds social capital is the following  
 
Pr(corrupt-averse , social capital | x) = )|1,1Pr( 21 xyy    
                                                             = )|0,0Pr( 2
*
1
* xyy   
                                                             =  )','Pr( 222111 xuxu    
                                                              = ),','( 22112  xx                 (9)  
 
where 2  is the standard bivariate normal distribution. 
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3.2 Data Description and Variables 
The data derives from the survey of social capital conducted by the Palestine Economic 
Policy Research Institute (MAS) in 2007. The survey contains several sections where a 
number of opinions regarding public spirit, trust, shared values and norms have been 
collected from a random sample of individuals (2,508 observations) located in West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. Almost 50.3% of the individuals are males and 2,344 individuals out of 2,350 
are included in the aging interval 16 – 922 (table 1). 
 
 
Table 1 Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Bribe 2331 0.962 0.192 0 1 
Fight  2494 0.958 0.200 0 1 
Vol  2488 0.414 0.493 0 1 
Social trust 2302 0.156 0.363 0 1 
civic 2352 0.594 0.491 0 1 
age 2344 36.310 13.856 16 92 
2age  2344 1510.36 1186.669 0 8464 
female 2350 0.503 0.500 0 1 
education 2351 3.772 1.518 1 8 
employed 2352 0.431 0.495 0 1 
Rule law 2337  2.919 0.306 1 3 
Institutional 
trust 
2352  12.420 5.062 0 24 
Marital 
status 
2497 0.647 0.478 0 1 
family 2338 35.900 17.716 0 52 
bridging 2247 28.067 15.205 0 52 
 
For political and security reasons, in Gaza the survey is conducted according to the Strip’s 
population as a whole rather than to demographic characteristics at sub-group levels as in 
West Bank (Nasr and Hilal 2007). This makes the sample unequally distributed, since more 
than 91% of the sample belongs to West Bank, affecting the reliability of a potential regional 
dummy variable. Even though we do not have access to the survey response rate, the survey 
has been conducted according to the statistical validity and sampling procedures of the PCBS 
(Nasr and Hilal 2007). The statistical validity of the sampling process is reinforced by 
comparing the stratification of the representative sample with the socio-demographic 
                                                          
2
 The six missing individuals not included in the 2,344 are less than 16 years old. More precisely they are less 
than 10 years old.  
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statistics regularly reported by the PCBS (PCBS 2010). For example, the PCBS reports that 
the distribution of the higher education by gender as follow: 55% for females and 45% for 
males. Similarly, in our survey, the proportion of female respondents with higher education is 
of 57% against 43% of males. In terms of labour market, the unemployment rate estimated 
among the respondents living in WB is of 19.8% very similar to the unemployment rate of 
18.6% reported by the PCBS. 
On the basis of the bivariate probit model specified in the equations (2) and (3), table 2 
reports the binomial dependent variables of corruption and of social capital.  
 
 
Table 2 Dependent variables of corruption and social capital  
Bribe )1Pr( Bribey  “can’t justify at all  bribery at work” is the answer 
to the question “In your opinion can you justify these behaviours 
by other people?” 
)0Pr( Bribey  Otherwise 
Fighting 
corruption 
)1Pr( Fighty  “Fighting corruption is very important”  
)0Pr( Fighty  Otherwise 
Volunteer )1Pr( Voly  If the answer to the question “in the last 12 months 
did you volunteer?” is “Yes” 
)0Pr( Voly  Otherwise 
Civic )1Pr( Civicy  “can’t justify at all: absence from work without 
reasonable reasons, abstention in elections, no commitments to 
traffic rules, buying stolen products, finding a wallet and not give 
it back to the police” 
)0Pr( Civicy  Otherwise 
 
 
In the reduced form, the probability of declaring to be corrupt-averse and the probability of 
holding social capital are functions of covariates kix which is a vector of socio-economic 
factors.  
As suggested by Glaeser et al (2002) and De Blasio et al (2010), social capital can be affected 
by several individuals’ socio-economic characteristics. Glaeser et al (2002) point out that 
social capital rises with the age and then falls, it is positively affected by the level of 
education and the level of occupation. De Blasio et al (2010) find that in Italy older and more 
educated individuals are more likely to cooperate and to have a higher degree of public spirit. 
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Unlike De Blasio et al (2010) and Glaeser et al (2010), the variables homeownership and 
income are missing as well as the variable of geographical proximity among individuals. 
Glaeser et al (2002) stress the fact that reduced physical distance intensifies social 
connections and, hence, favour cooperation and social capital. We replace this missing 
variable with the frequency of the individuals of meeting the family, the friends and the 
neighbours
3
. As suggested by Bowles et al (2002) a more efficient regulatory capacity from a 
formal institution is likely to favour even more cooperation and pro-social behaviour 
especially in the case where the rule of law is considered important by the recipients. In fact, 
better regulatory capacity and better institutional performance along with individual 
characteristics (education, occupation and age) are positively related to anti-corrupt 
behaviour (Bjornskov 2003, Seldadyo et al 2006). Following this literature, our covariates 
includes age, age squared, gender (male), the educational level (education), being employed 
(employed), the importance of the rule of law (Rule law), the trust in public institutions 
(institutional trust), trust towards people in general (social trust), the family network (family), 
the network composed by friends and neighbours (bridging), and the marital status (marital 
status).  
  
 
4 Empirical Results 
  
4.1 Empirical results of the Baseline Model 
Table 3 shows the correlations between errors of corruption and social capital of these 
reduced forms. The   is statistically significant in all the specified baseline models. In the 
cases in which the social capital variable is expressed in terms of civic attitude the coefficient 
of   is positive and statistically significant at 1% statistical significant level. In these cases 
the LR test indicates that the null hypothesis of   = 0 is rejected at 1% level. Hence, the two 
variables/errors are correlated (given 0 ) suggesting that the probability of one variable 
will positively depend on the value/probability of the other and that the bivariate probit fits 
the data better than separate models.  
                                                          
3
 Frequency of meetings and physical distance are not equivalent. However, the Palestinian Territories suffer of 
the presence of physical obstacles that limit the movement of Palestinians within the Territories tremendously. 
This means that in general Palestinians are likely to limit their movements within short distances. Hence, higher 
frequency of contacts definitively implies higher geographical proximity.     
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In the cases in which the social capital variable is expressed in terms of voluntary activities, 
the coefficient of   is negative and statistically significant at 5% statistical significant level. 
According to the LR test, the null hypothesis of   = 0 is rejected at 5% statistical significant 
level indicating that the two variables/errors are correlated (given 0 ). This suggests that 
the probability of one variable will negatively depend on the value/probability of the other 
and the bivariate probit fits the data better than separate models.  
 
       
Table 3 Bivariate probit and correlation between errors of corrupt-averse and social capital 
 )1Pr( Bribey  
)1Pr( Voly  
)1Pr( Bribey  
)1Pr( Civicy  
)1Pr( Fighty  
)1Pr( Voly  
)1Pr( Fighty  
)1Pr( Civicy  
N 2,335 2,342 2,346 2,353 
MLL -1850.88 -1833.92 -1758.48 -1790.96 
  -0.129** 0.631*** -0.156** 0.295*** 
se(  ) 0.063 0.051 0.075 0.07 
)0:( 0 HLR  4.163** 102.445*** 4.268** 16.268*** 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Marginal effects on joint probabilities  
We consider the marginal effects on the joint probabilities of the respondents of declaring to 
be corrupt averse and holding social capital )1,1Pr( 21  yy  as in equation (9)
4
.  
Table 4 reports the marginal effects on the joint probabilities to be corrupt-averse and holding 
social capital.  
All the estimations report that the joint probabilities of being corrupt-averse and holding 
social capital increases with trust in institutions and with the importance of the rule of law in 
both of the social capital and corrupt-averse specifications. The coefficient of the predictor 
rule law is much higher in the specified case of joint probability of be against the use of 
bribes and holding civic attitude (column 2). In fact, in this case the joint probability of being 
against bribes and holding civic increases by 0.19 among individuals who consider the rule of 
law very important. The joint probabilities of holding social capital and being corrupt-averse 
                                                          
4
 Notice that we have four joint probabilities: )1,1Pr( 21  yy ; )0,1Pr( 21  yy ; )1,0Pr( 21  yy ; 
)0,0Pr( 21  yy . We focus the attention on the first type since we consider it more related to the statement 
of social capital and corruption puzzle described by equation (1). 
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increase with education in all the specifications except for the one of being against the use of 
bribe and in favour of civic attitude (column 2). The variable social trust seems to be 
statistically not significant where social capital is expressed in terms of civic attitude while it 
seems to be a negative predictor of the joint probability of being corrupt-averse and holding 
social capital where social capital is expressed with the variable vol. The joint probability of 
being involved in voluntary activities and being corrupt-averse increases with the network of 
friends and neighbours. This variable seems to be not statistically significant in the other two 
cases.  
 
 
Table 4 Marginal effects  
 )1Pr( Bribey  
)1Pr( Voly  
)1Pr( Bribey  
)1Pr( Civicy  
)1Pr( Fighty  
)1Pr( Voly  
)1Pr( Fighty  
)1Pr( Civicy  
Rule law 0.072** 
(0.034) 
0.186*** 
(0.033) 
0.099*** 
(0.035) 
0.202*** 
(0.034) 
Trust institutions 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.008**** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Social trust -0.050* 
(0.028) 
0.017 
(0.028) 
-0.054* 
(0.028) 
0.016 
(0.028) 
Family 0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
Bridging 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Age 0.002 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Age squared -0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Male 0.091*** 
(0.023) 
-0.039* 
(0.023) 
0.094*** 
(0.023) 
-0.037 
(0.023) 
Education 0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.030*** 
(0.008) 
0.013* 
(0.008) 
Employed 0.089*** 
(0.025) 
0.001 
(0.025) 
0.088*** 
(0.025) 
-0.004 
(0.025) 
Marital status -0.047* 
(0.026) 
0.050* 
(0.026) 
-0.050* 
(0.026) 
0.055** 
(0.026) 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parenthesis below each coefficient 
 
 
 
4.3 Predicted conditional probabilities.  
We estimate predicted conditional probabilities on a representative male individual of age 40, 
with a high school education, married, with an average frequency of meeting family and 
friends and employed.  
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These odd ratios are computed in response to a change in the parameters of the rule of law 
and institutional trust, on the one hand, and in considering whether the individual trust people 
in general (social trust = 1) or otherwise (social trust = 0).  
On the basis of this framework, we say that our individual has a positive view of the formal 
institutions if he considers the rule of law very important and he has high trust in the 
institutions. Otherwise, we say that our individual has a negative view of the formal 
institutions.   
 
 
Table 5: Predicted conditional probabilities (odds ratios)  
Section I Social trust = 1 
 
)0|1Pr(
)1|1Pr(


CivicBribe
CivicBribe
yy
yy
 
)0|1Pr(
)1|1Pr(


VolBribe
VolBribe
yy
yy
 
High institutional trust & high 
importance of the rule of law* 
1.016  (1.6% ↑) 0.997  (0.3% ↓) 
Low institutional trust &low 
importance of the rule of law 
1.041  (4.1% ↑) 0.984  (1.6% ↓) 
Section II Social trust = 0  
 
)0|1Pr(
)1|1Pr(


CivicBribe
CivicBribe
yy
yy
 
)0|1Pr(
)1|1Pr(


VolBribe
VolBribe
yy
yy
 
High institutional trust & high 
importance of the rule of law* 
1.028  (2.8% ↑) 0.995  (0.5% ↓) 
Low institutional trust &low 
importance of the rule of law 
1.063  (6.3% ↑) 0.978  (2.2% ↓) 
Section III Social trust = 1 
 
)0|1Pr(
)1|1Pr(


CivicFight
CivicFight
yy
yy
 
)0|1Pr(
)1|1Pr(


VolFight
VolFight
yy
yy
 
High institutional trust & high 
importance of the rule of law 
1.030  (3% ↑) 0.986  (1.4% ↓) 
Low institutional trust &low 
importance of the rule of law 
1.881  (88.1% ↑) 0.689  (31.1% ↓) 
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Section IV Social trust = 0 
 
)0|1Pr(
)1|1Pr(


CivicFight
CivicFight
yy
yy
 
)0|1Pr(
)1|1Pr(


VolFight
VolFight
yy
yy
 
High institutional trust &high 
importance of the rule of law 
1.058  (5.8% ↑) 0.974  (2.6% ↓) 
Low institutional trust &low 
importance of the rule of law 
2.146  (146% ↑) 0.650  (35% ↓) 
*We consider the maximum score of institutional trust, 32, the equivalent of 100% of trust in the institutions. 
Hence, we calibrate “High Institutional Trust” with a score of 24 which indicates at least 75% of trust in 
institutions. Instead we calibrate “Low Institutional Trust” with a score of 8 which indicates only 25% of trust in 
institutions. The importance of the rule of law is a parameter assuming values 1 (not important) and 3(very 
important).      
 
 
Table 5 reports that the representative individual is more likely to be corrupt-averse in the 
presence of civic attitude than in absence of it. This difference is even larger under a negative 
view of formal institutions. Section I reports that in the presence of social trust, for an 
individual with appositive view of formal institutions the probability of being corrupt-averse 
when the individual holds civic attitude is about 1.6% higher than in absence of civic attitude. 
This probability rises up to 4.1% in the case of negative view of formal institutions. It seems 
that under negative view of formal institutions the individual needs more civic attitude to 
cope with corrupt aversion. Even though we find a similar pattern also in absence of social 
trust as in Section II, it seems that in this case the need for civic attitude seems to generally 
increase: 2.8% (against 1.6% of Section I) and 6.3% (against 4.1% of Section I). 
The different attitude toward corrupt aversion captured by the presence or absence of civic 
attitude seems to be tremendously exacerbated when we consider the attitude toward 
“fighting corruption” as in sections III and IV. In fact, in the presence of social trust, Section 
III, reports that probability of an individual with a positive view of formal institutions to be 
corrupt-averse when the individual holds civic attitude is about 3% higher than in absence of 
civic attitude. This probability rises up to 88.1% under negative view of formal institutions 
and up to 146% (Section IV) if we add a condition of absence of social trust. This suggests 
that when an individual does not trust others and has a negative view of formal institutions, 
the probability of being corrupt averse requires a large endowment of civic attitude.     
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When we consider social capital expressed in terms of voluntary activity in all the four 
sections, it seems that individuals involved in voluntary activities tend to be less corrupt 
averse than when they are not involved. This probability lowers even further in case of 
negative view of formal institutions and in the absence of social trust.                 
 
 
5 Robustness Analysis  
 
We address the issue of robustness through a sensitivity analysis in which we take into 
account the single items composing the institutional trust and the impact of social trust on the 
joint probability of being involved in voluntary activities and not being corrupt-averse.  
 
 
5.1 Trust in Public Institutions     
It can be argued that the potential substitutive and complementary relationships occurring 
among the single components of institutional trust are not captured by the composite 
indicator. Furthermore, institutions closer to the citizens such as local government and police 
might have a higher marginal effect on the joint probabilities. Hence, we conduct our baseline 
model by estimating the marginal effects of each of the components of the variable 
institutional trust separately to avoid possible risks of multicollinearity
5
. Table 6 report the 
estimations related to the single institutional trust items. These indicate that in most of the 
cases all the coefficients of the single components of institutional trust have a positive and 
significant marginal effect on the joint probabilities except in two cases: trust in clan and trust 
in the judicial system when we consider individuals involved in voluntary activities.        
 
 
Table 6: marginal effects of the single institutional trust items 
Trust  
single institutions  
)1Pr( Bribey  
)1Pr( Voly  
)1Pr( Bribey  
)1Pr( Civicy  
)1Pr( Fighty  
)1Pr( Voly  
)1Pr( Fighty  
)1Pr( Civicy  
Clan 0.003 
(0.013) 
0.047*** 
(0.013) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
0.043*** 
(0.013) 
                                                          
5
 Notice that the marginal effects of the socio-economic covariates (not included in the table but in the empirical 
model) do not vary significantly from the baseline model.   
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Government 0.03*** 
(0.011) 
0.03*** 
(0.011) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
0.027** 
(0.011) 
Parties 0.049*** 
(0.03) 
0.035*** 
(0.011) 
0.044*** 
(0.012) 
0.032*** 
(0.011) 
Local govern. 0.026** 
(0.011) 
0.046*** 
(0.011) 
0.019* 
(0.011) 
0.043*** 
(0.011) 
Parliament 0.028** 
(0.011) 
0.025** 
(0.011) 
0.023** 
(0.011) 
0.023** 
(0.011) 
President 0.026** 
(0.011) 
0.039*** 
(0.01) 
0.022** 
(0.011) 
0.037*** 
(0.01) 
Judicial 0.01 
(0.011) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
0.024** 
(0.011) 
Police 0.024** 
(0.011) 
0.039*** 
(0.01) 
0.021* 
(0.01) 
0.038*** 
(0.01) 
 * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parenthesis below each coefficient 
 
   
5.2 Social Trust between Voluntary Activity and Corrupt-Aversion 
Given the flourishing literature on the positive relationship between social trust and corrupt-
averse attitude (Uslaner 2002, Bjornskov 2011), it is quite surprising the negative impact of 
social trust on the joint probability of being corrupt-averse and being involved in voluntary 
activities as in table 4. In light of the particular conditions of the Palestinians, we might 
assume that social trust is more likely to be negatively related to Voly  than to the corrupt-
averse attitude. This would explain the initial negative impact of social trust on the joint 
probability of declaring to be corrupt-averse and being involved in voluntary associations. 
For this reason and given the negative relationship between the variables of corrupt-aversion 
and Voly we estimate the marginal effects of the joint probabilities of being involved in 
voluntary activities and not being corrupt-averse (Table 7).  
The estimations in table 7 seem to support our conjecture. The joint probability of being 
involved in voluntary activities and not being corrupt-averse increases with social trust in 
both the specifications. It seems that social trust is highly negatively correlated with the 
variable vol rather than with the corrupt-averse attitude. 
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Table 7: Marginal Effects of being involved in voluntary activities but not being corrupt-
averse 
 )0Pr( Bribey  
)1Pr( Voly  
)0Pr( Fighty  
)1Pr( Voly  
Rule law -0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.032*** 
(0.006) 
Trust institutions -0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Social trust -0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
Family -0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Bridging 0.0003** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Age -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Age squared 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Male 0.006 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Education 0.0001** 
(0.002) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
Employed 0.004 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
Marital status -0.009* 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
  * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parenthesis below each coefficient 
 
 
5.3 Alternative Baseline Models for Civic Attitude 
Given the particular condition of the Palestinian society we consider alternative baseline 
models for our civic attitude as well as alternative indicators of civic.  
Firstly, because of the small range of the composite items based on a 3-level scale we 
consider the indicator civic2 with a median cut-off rather than the mean like in the original 
baseline model.  
Secondly, the lack of sovereignty due to the absence of an established independent state 
might compromise the meaning of civic attitude for Palestinians. In fact, some respondents 
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might be disappointed about the way the process of state capacity building has been 
implemented so far and they might exercise their disagreement by not voting to elections. In 
addition, this discontent might undermine the trust of the Palestinians toward politicians. The 
sensitivity of these circumstances might affect the direction of our indicator and, hence, 
undermine our initial set-up. For this reason we replicate our baseline bivariate model by 
considering an alternative version of civic attitude, civic3, without the item abstention to 
elections as well as by running the model for the sub-sample of respondents who do not trust 
politicians at all.  
 
 
Table 8: Alternative indicators of civic attitude 
 )1Pr( Bribey  
)1Pr( Civicy  
Original 
baseline model 
)1Pr( Bribey  
)1Pr( 2 Civicy  
Median cut-off 
)1Pr( Bribey  
)1Pr( 3 Civicy  
No item of 
abstention to 
elections 
)1Pr( Bribey  
)1Pr( Civicy  
No trust 
politicians at all  
N 2,342 2,342 2,342 800 
MLL -1833.92 -1833.92 -1706.41 -607.05 
  0.631*** 0.631*** 0.957*** 0.583*** 
se(  ) 0.051 0.051 0.43 0.105 
)0:( 0 HLR  102.445*** 102.445*** 180.91*** 22.188*** 
 )1Pr( Fighty  
)1Pr( Civicy  
)1Pr( Fighty  
)1Pr( 2 Civicy  
)1Pr( Fighty  
)1Pr( 3 Civicy  
)1Pr( Fighty  
)1Pr( Civicy  
N 2,353 2,353 2,353 803 
MLL -1790.96 -1790.96 -1703.13 -614.74 
  0.295*** 0.295*** 0.366*** 0.271*** 
se(  ) 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.126 
)0:( 0 HLR  16.268*** 16.268*** 25.379*** 4.295*** 
 * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
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Table 8 shows that in all the alternative specifications the positive and significant correlation 
between civic attitude and attitudes toward corrupt aversion remain unaltered where the LR 
test rejects the hypothesis of independency of the equation of attitudes of corrupt aversion 
and each alternative specification of civic. In all specifications the non-zero correlation 
between the residuals is statistically significant at 1% statistical level. In the case of civic2 
given the small difference in the cut-off 0f 0.48 the estimations remain unaltered. In the case 
of civic3 the correlations coefficient is higher especially in the case of the attitude toward the 
use of bribe. This difference might capture the Palestinians’ disappointment about the 
ongoing process of state capacity building and hence lower their trust towards politicians. 
This results are confirmed even when we consider a sub-sample of respondents who do not 
trust politicians at all. Not surprisingly, in this case the correlations coefficients are slightly 
lower, 0.583 and 0.271, compare to the 0.631 and 0.295 respectively of the original baseline 
model but still high and positive.  
 
 
6 Limitations  
 
These results need to be interpreted in the light of, at least, four limitations.  
Firstly, this paper is mainly concerned about the Palestinian context. Caution is needed in 
generalising these results since, unlike other geopolitical realities, the WBGS is not an 
independent state. Nevertheless, it seems that the higher credibility of the formal institutions 
and the legal system plays a crucial role in shaping Palestinians’ attitude towards corrupt 
aversion.  
Secondly, from our analysis it is not possible to estimate the average level of corruption of 
specific groups (for instance self-employed or public sector workers). The survey does not 
permit the production any type of estimate on the shadow economy. However, this goes 
beyond the aim of this study. Instead, one of the major contributions that this work aims to 
provide is to shed light on the attitude of citizens toward corruption especially in view of a 
more consistent process of state-capacity building. 
Finally, the variable bribe might be affected by self reporting bias. Individuals might tend to 
overvalue their anti-corrupt spirit and, hence, provide answers not corresponding to their true 
opinion (Azfar and Murrell, 2009). From an enterprise survey for Nigeria, Clausen et al 
(2010) identify 13.1% of respondents on questions about corruption to be reticent. Given that 
this proportion is a subset of all reticent respondents, they also estimate that the percentage of 
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reticent respondents of that survey might be even greater than 30%. The type of phrasing the 
questions about corruption is one of the main factors of biased answers. The less personal the 
questions are the higher is the probability of obtaining unbiased estimates since the 
respondents feel more protected by the general structure of the sentence (Clausen et al, 2010). 
Moreover, still Clausen et al (2010) point out that this unbiased condition is favoured by less 
topic-specialised surveys. For instance, where surveys are mainly focused on corruption, 
respondents might become more reticent because they might feel that every question could 
provide additional inferences about the respondent’s own behaviour. On the other hand, a 
more general survey in which the topic “corruption” is only one of the numerous behavioural 
questions might reduce this risk. We argue that the data source used in this paper corresponds 
to the latter scenario for, at least, two reasons. Firstly, the survey on social capital conducted 
by MAS (2007) covers multi-dimensional aspects of citizens’ behaviours where the attitude 
towards corruption is only one of them. In fact, the individuals in the survey are required to 
answer to questions about many aspects of their social, political and civil life. Hence, the 
questions about corruption are limited to a small sub-section. Secondly, the questions on 
corruption are general rather than personal. They are mainly based on the respondents’ 
opinion about other people’s behaviour or about the concept of corruption within a general 
perspective
6
.  
Finally, unlike other empirical works (Bjornskov 2003, De Blasio et al 2010, Kingston 2005, 
Paldam 2002), the model specification does not include the variable income since it is 
missing from our data set. On the other hand, it is also true that De Blasio et al (2010) did not 
find any significant correlation between individual income and social behaviour. It is possible 
that this variable might work better when the analysis is addressed at a macro level and cross-
country as in Paldam (2002). An initial alterative to our model include different working 
sectors such as public, private and self-employed. Individuals working in the public sectors 
are likely to deal more directly with bribes than workers in the private sector and/or self-
employed workers (Kingston 2005). When we include these working sectors in our model 
results do not change significantly. For instance, the marginal effects on joint probabilities 
are unchanged.  
   
 
                                                          
6
 A common problem of surveys dealing with corruption is the trade-off between the accuracy of the questions 
(general or specific and how much general or how much specific) and the unbiased answer. This survey is not 
able to overcome this problem. However, we believe that biased estimates are mitigated and reduced by the 
structure of the survey and the phrasing of the questions.    
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7 Conclusions 
 
The main perception from our analysis is that, in general, the Palestinians declare to be 
corrupt averse.  
Empirical evidence indicates that corrupt aversion is lower for Palestinians involved in 
associational activities. This might have a twofold speculative explanation. Firstly, the 
individuals that are more involved in voluntary activities might also be more aware about the 
dysfunctional characteristics of the public institutions and hence more willing to pursue their 
social goals through the participation to associations. This can have the consequence of 
considering fighting corruption not a priority in their strategic agenda. Secondly, the 
polarisation of the voluntary sector in the Palestinian context favours the creation of vertical 
linkages between the organisations pro-Palestinian Authority and the public officials based 
on a system of nepotism and clientelistic network (Jamal 2007). These linkages might induce 
the individuals involved in assessing rent-seeking behaviour less rigorously as well as 
augment a feeling of suspect among the citizens even where corrupt exchange between 
voluntary organisations and public institutions are inexistent. This latter concern might be 
connected with the result of the anti-corruption survey conducted by Transparency 
International in the Palestinian Territories in 2013 according to which 27% of the respondents 
feel that NGOs in the Palestinian Territories are corrupt if not extremely corrupt
7
.     
However, unlike the voluntary activity, civic attitude seems to be positively related to 
attitudes of corrupt aversion. These results are amplified by the Palestinian’s view on formal 
institutions and their social trust. Predicted conditional probabilities suggest that under 
negative view of formal institutions and lack of social trust Palestinians need more civic 
attitude in order to cope with corrupt aversion.  
At this stage, policy recommendations become as important as difficult to propose. A crucial 
insight provided by our analysis is that Palestinians seem to be willing to cooperate as long as 
the regulatory context favours the collective action solution. This insight is quite clearly 
suggested by the positive relation of institutional trust and the importance of the rule of law 
with the variables of corrupt aversion. Individuals that trust institutions declare, more than 
others, that corrupt exchanges cannot be accepted. These individuals also highlight the crucial 
importance of the rule of law. In other words, given a reliable institutional setting and legal 
                                                          
7
 The results of this survey is in the website of Transparency International 
http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=palestine  
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framework, Palestinians would tend to disapprove corruption. This might provide a signal 
that the culture of legacy is not absent in the Palestinian social context. This searching for a 
more stable institutional and legal framework might be emphasised by the particular 
geopolitical conditions of the area. Indeed, a resetting of the geopolitical arena is likely to 
affect the mechanism of informal institutions either in terms of trust or in terms of civic 
attitude (or both). Policy recommendations, hence, might go beyond simple socio-economic 
interventions including fiscal and social policies. Instead, changes in the legal framework and 
“institutional attitude” might be the keys for reducing problems of corruption.  
For “Institutional attitude” we mean the attitude assumed by the Institutions, from the 
government to the juridical court in fighting corrupt exchanges. For instance, the anti-corrupt 
public prosecution and the penal system for crimes of corruption are denounced to be weak 
and inefficient (AMAN 2009). Law enforcement officers including police, experts in anti-
corruption investigation and administrations of prisons are affected by a similar problem. In 
this sense a more efficient coordination among the different agencies engaged in combating 
corruption might be beneficial. Moreover, despite the significant improvement in the juridical 
system during the year 2009, the complexity of some legal texts and procedures still represent 
an additional obstacle for law and order. AMAN (2009) underlines that especially in the 
cases of non-ministerial institutions (the Water Authority, the Electricity Authority, the 
Telecommunication Authority and the Palestinian Standard Institution) prosecutors have no 
authority to prosecute its corrupted members. This, of course, undermines the transparency 
process and the idea of integrity of the Palestinian institutions in general.    
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A1: Variables and coding scheme 
 
Dependent variable - Corruption 
Variables Description Range 
Bribe “Can you justify bribery at 
work?” 
Bribe = 1 if “can’t justify 
at all bribery at work” 
Bribe = 0 otherwise 
Fight   “Fighting Corruption”  Fight = 1 if “Fighting 
corruption is very 
important” 
Fight = 0 Otherwise 
Dependent variables - Social Capital 
Variables Description Range 
Vol “In the last 12 months did 
you volunteer?” 
Vol = 1 if the answer to the 
question is yes 
Vol = 0 Otherwise 
Civic “Can you justify these 
behaviours by other 
people?” 
“absence from work 
without reasonable 
reasons, assenteism in 
elections, not commitment 
to traffic rules, buying 
stolen products, finding a 
wallet and not give it back 
to the police”  
 
The answers to each 
behaviour follows a scale 
(1-3) 
1. I can justify it 
2. I can justify it 
sometimes 
3. I can’t justify it at 
all 
We set a composite 
variable called behaviour 
which is the sum of the 
scores obtained by 
answering all the 
questions. The range of 
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behaviour is [0 15]. The 
mean of behaviour from 
the survey is 13.5  
Civic = 1 if behaviour is at 
least 13.5 
Civic = 0 otherwise 
Covariates 
Variables Description Range 
age Age of the individuals 16 - 92 
2age  Age squared  256 - 8464 
female Individuals that are female Female = 1 if the 
individual is female 
Female = 0 otherwise 
education Level of education 1. illiterate 2. primary 3. 
secondary 4. high school 
5. diploma 6. bachelor 7. 
diploma after bachelor 8. 
master or more 
employed Individual employed Employed = 1 if the 
individual is employed 
Employed = 0 otherwise 
Rule law “Which is the importance 
of the rule of law?” 
1. not important 
2. important 
3. very important 
Range = [1 3] 
Institutional trust “How is your trust for 
these institutions?” 
Clan, Government, parties, 
local government, 
Parliament, Court of 
Justice, police  
The score for each answer 
is the following 
1 = no trust 
2= little trust 
3 = somehow trust 
4 = lot of trust 
 
The measure is composite 
and sum up the values over 
the six institutions. Hence 
the range of institutional 
trust is [0 24]  
Social trust Can you say that you can 
trust people in general?” 
Social trust = 1 if the 
answer to the question is 
“yes”  
Social trust = 1 Otherwise 
Marital status Individuals that are 
married 
Marital status = 1 if the 
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individual is married 
Marital status = 0 
otherwise 
family frequency of an individual 
of meeting the family 
and/or talking to the 
family via phone/email 
The scores are the 
following: 
52 = once a week 
24 = once or twice a 
month 
6 = few times a year 
0 = never 
 
Range of family = [0 52] 
bridging synthetic measure 
composed by the 
frequency of an individual 
of having contacts with 
friends (visiting, inviting 
friends, contacting them 
via phone or via email) 
and neighbours (visiting, 
inviting neighbours, 
contacting them via phone 
or via email)  
The scores are the 
following 
For friends: 
52 = once a week 
24 = once or twice a 
month 
6 = few times a year 
0 = never 
 
For neighbours 
52 = once a week 
24 = once or twice a 
month 
6 = few times a year 
0 = never 
 
Bridging = 
(friends+neighbour)/2 
 
The range of bridging = [0 
52] 
  
   
 
 
